We are now only 12 days into the fighting, with our attention rightly on Ukrainians’ inspired defense of their freedom, but we need to think very hard about how the war in Ukraine will end.
US policy right now is reacting to events in Ukraine. While we need to respond in every way we can to what is happening on the ground, we also need to be focused on how our actions can impact the course of the war going forward. US policy must be guided by how we want the war to end.
There are five different possible outcomes to the war in Ukraine. Four reward Russian aggression while only one leaves Ukraine a free and independent nation. I have listed these outcomes, from best to worst, below.
1) Ukraine Forces Russia to Withdraw
Ideally, Ukraine will be able to prevail over the Russian military and force it to withdraw from the territory it has invaded. This outcome basically restores the status quo ante, which means that Russia would retain control of Crimea as well as at least parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has not had regaining Crimea as a wartime goal and, most importantly, this outcome preserves Ukrainian freedom and sovereignty.
2) Ukraine Fights Russia to a Stalemate
The more likely military outcome is that Ukraine and Russia fight to a bloody stalemate. Russia can’t advance beyond the territory it has taken and Ukraine can’t force Russia to pull back from the areas it has seized. This outcome assumes there are ongoing hostilities and that any negotiations between the two sides are also stalemated. It also assumes that Ukraine will never concede any territory and that it will adhere to its ultimate goal of forcing Russia to withdraw from the areas it has invaded. This outcome leaves Russia mired in a bitter and costly conflict, but it also leaves it in control of at least part, and potentially a sizable part, of Ukraine.
3) Ukraine Mounts an Insurgency
It is much less likely that Russia will be able to defeat Ukraine’s conventional forces and seize control of the country. The general consensus is that Russia does not have sufficient forces deployed to accomplish this and, given the poor performance of its frontline units, it’s unclear if it has any reserves that could make a difference. Even if the Russian military were able to occupy the country, it almost certainly would face a determined insurgency. Still, while Russia would be forced to deal with an ongoing armed resistance, it would have achieved its goal of acquiring, if not fully pacifying, Ukraine.
4) Ukraine and Russia Agree to Territorial Adjustments
Depending on US and European resolve, this could be the likeliest outcome. If the war grinds into an ugly stalemate, Ukraine may find itself compelled to enter peace negotiations that end up codifying the military reality on the ground. It could be that it no longer receives the outside support needed to continue fighting. It could also be that Ukraine is encouraged to enter negotiations so as to end the ongoing carnage and loss of life. Ukraine could then find itself in negotiations in which it is forced to cede territory in return for an unequal and uneasy peace.
5) Russia Seizes Ukraine and Subdues any Resistance
There is also the possibility that Russian forces could seize control of Ukraine and then use brutal, Stalinist methods to suppress any possible insurgency and subdue the populace. Russia could either install a puppet regime or, as Putin has recently suggested in denying a separate Ukraine exists, absorb Ukraine into Russia proper. This outcome would represent the ultimate reward for Russia’s barbaric and illegal use of force.
It is not clear where the United States stands on the different possible outcomes in Ukraine. Strategy involves matching means to ends and US policy has not defined what our goals in the Ukraine war are. In his State of the Union Address on March 1, President Biden noted that “Together with our allies we are providing support to the Ukrainians in their fight for freedom.“ He went on to identify this support as military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. This assistance is vital, but by itself it does not reflect a coherent strategy. Critically, in his speech Biden did not state what this assistance is ultimately meant to achieve.
I believe that the overarching goal for the United States has to be the first outcome, with Russia forced to withdraw from Ukraine. We need a Biden doctrine that clearly states that the United States will not acquiesce in the face of Russian aggression and that we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes until it is successful in its fight to preserve its freedom and independence. In Churchill’s famous phrase, we need to make clear that “we shall go on to the end.” With this as our policy, it is possible to match ends and means in our strategy. We need to do everything we can to aid Ukraine in its struggle, to include ratcheting up the pressure on Russia in any way we can.
It is impossible to say how likely the first outcome is in the near term. No one is predicting a swift Ukrainian victory, but if it was implausible before Russia invaded that Ukraine could prevail, this is no longer the case. We have all been surprised at how poorly and ineptly the Russian military has performed. And as the fighting continues, it seems that the Ukrainian forces are getting stronger while the Russian forces are getting weaker. Ukraine is mobilizing and training large numbers of its population to fight and arming them with a growing supply of arms from the West, while Russia is sustaining serious losses of men and material. There is also the possibility, impossible to quantify, that Russia’s mounting losses in Ukraine, together with its increasing international isolation, bring about a change in the political leadership in Moscow and, with it, a reversal of Russian policy in Ukraine.
The identification of the other possible outcomes in Ukraine also underscores why it is so imperative that Ukraine prevail and force a Russian withdrawal.
Consider that we are confronted with outcome 2, where Ukraine is able to stop but not to reverse Russian aggression. The danger here is that we may end up in a kind of appeasement trap, in which the desire to negotiate an end to the hostilities results in pressure brought on Ukraine to accept terms under which it cedes territory in return for independence and security guarantees for its remaining area.
At this point, in effect, outcome 2 has become outcome 4. Such an outcome, where Ukraine and Russia agree to territorial adjustments, would not only reward Russian aggression but could also leave Ukraine a rump state. It is possible that Russian forces may be able to seize much of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River as well as a strip of Ukraine along the Black Sea coast. If Russia was not forced to withdraw from these areas, Ukraine would effectively no longer be a viable state.
Two things could weaken Western resolve to stand firm on its position that Russia must withdraw from Ukraine. The first is the terrible human suffering involved in the war. The understandable desire to end the carnage could lead Western governments to back ceasefire measures that lock Russian territorial gains in place. The second is time. Over time, with the war at a stalemate, there could be Western nations and firms that begin to defect from the sanctions and other measures in place on Russia.
The United States needs to make absolutely clear that it will never agree to outcome 4 or outcome 5, in which Russia has seized and turned Ukraine into a puppet state or even part of Greater Russia. The United States was able to sustain its containment strategy of the Soviet Union for the 45 years of the Cold War and we similarly need to be prepared to lead a united front against Russian aggression in Ukraine for as long as needed.
What is manifestly clear is that US support is essential if Ukraine is ultimately to defeat the Russian invasion. We need to provide weapons, intelligence, and logistical support and, even more, we need to lead the way in bringing economic and political pressure to bear on Moscow. Hopefully, Ukraine will continue to outfight the Russian forces but, if necessary, we need to be prepared to continue to assist Ukraine if the fighting bogs down into a protracted conflict. If it unfortunately comes to it, we also need to be prepared to support a Ukrainian insurgency against Russian occupation.
We need a bold, coherent, and unambiguous US policy that guides how we bring every means to bear that we can in aiding Ukraine in its desperate fight for its life. In defining the fundamental goal of US action, this policy needs to unequivocally state that the only acceptable outcome in Ukraine is a complete withdrawal of Russian forces to the prewar lines.